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Decoding the Guerrilla Threat: ELN's Power Play on the Colombian-Venezuelan Border

January 15, 2026
  • #Venezuela
  • #Colombia
  • #ELN
  • #USForeignPolicy
  • #LatinAmerica
  • #GuerrillaWarfare
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Decoding the Guerrilla Threat: ELN's Power Play on the Colombian-Venezuelan Border

Contextualizing the ELN's Rise

In the early hours of January 6, as geopolitical tensions soared following the U.S. capture of Nicolás Maduro, armed men from Colombia's National Liberation Army (ELN) intercepted a bus near Tibú, Colombia, seizing control and kidnapping police officers. This brazen act is not merely a cry for attention; it represents a strategic maneuver by the ELN to solidify its power amid a rapidly evolving political landscape.

The ELN: A Historical Overview

Founded in the 1960s as a leftist insurgency, the ELN has transformed dramatically, now entangled in various criminal enterprises, particularly following the collaboration with the Venezuelan regime. The group, boasting an estimated 6,300 fighters, has infiltrated Venezuela, creating a perilous nexus of violence and criminal activity across the porous border.

The ELN's opportunism illustrates a sophisticated understanding of power dynamics amid regional instability.

The Role of the U.S. in Regional Dynamics

Leading up to the U.S. military intervention in Caracas, signals from the Maduro government suggested a tacit acceptance of the ELN's activities, fueled by apprehensions over American military objectives. With a web of illicit economies—spanning drug trafficking and human smuggling—the ELN has cultivated control over a lucrative corridor stretching from the Atlantic to the Amazon.

The Danger of U.S. Policy Shifts

U.S. foreign policy towards Colombia has radically shifted from one of partnership to confrontation, particularly after President Trump's threats towards Bogotá post-Maduro's capture. Such incendiary rhetoric alienates a historical ally and risks aggravating tensions that could benefit groups like the ELN.

Impact on Colombian Security

  • Increased Violence: Displacement of civilians in regions like Catatumbo is already underway, as clashes between the ELN and local criminal factions escalate.
  • Strategic Dilemmas: Colombian President Gustavo Petro's military deployments have not quelled violence, demonstrating a need for a multifaceted approach involving diplomacy and humanitarian aid.
  • Humanitarian Crisis: The potential fallout from U.S. aggression could trigger not only violence but also a humanitarian crisis that would spill into Colombian territory.

Recommendations for U.S. Engagement

Instead of adopting a posture of aggression, the U.S. must recalibrate its strategy in Latin America. History tells us that military might does not equal stability; rather, the focus should pivot towards:

  • Intelligence Sharing: Enhancing cooperation with Colombian forces to tackle the complex web of organized crime.
  • Humanitarian Initiatives: Providing aid to mitigate the fallout from violence and instability.
  • Diplomatic Channels: Reinforcing collaborative efforts with Bogotá, ensuring that threats from the ELN do not spiral out of control.

The Path Forward: A Warning Sign

The ELN's growing might should be a clarion call for both Colombian and American authorities. Should they continue their current trajectories, we might witness a deterioration in regional stability, a surge in violence, and an ensuing humanitarian disaster. With the stakes at such an alarming height, our choices today will shape the security landscape of tomorrow.

To ignore the warnings from the ELN is to court catastrophe, not just for Colombia but for the entire region.

Conclusion

The intersection of U.S. foreign policy, local criminal dynamics, and the historical legacy of armed groups like the ELN demands our urgent attention. As geopolitics evolve, our strategies must adapt and respond thoughtfully to avoid exacerbating an already fraught situation.

Read the full article here.

Source reference: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/14/opinion/venezuela-maduro-colombia-petro-eln.html

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